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INTRODUCTION

In the 1990's, it is a truism that women have been liberated
from the home and have entered the workforce in unprecedented
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numbers. Because the presence of women in the halls of business is
so prevalent, Americans tend to believe that whatever problems
women encountered upon their initial venture into the world of work
have now been resolved. After all, the common reasoning infers, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been affording women
legal protection from job discrimination for more than a quarter of a
century, long enough to have established some clear precedents on
which women can rely to demand equality in the workforce.1 Unfortunately, the complacency which American men and women display
toward the issue of women's job rights is unwarranted.2 Although
legal precedents for equal treatment of women in low and middle
echelon jobs have been established under Title VII, parallel precedents for equal treatment of women seeking entry to the highest echelons of the professions in this country do not exist in comprehensive
form.3 In fact, the first battle, and one which took considerable time
to win, involved simply achieving legal recognition that promotion to
partnership is an area covered under Title VII. With the Supreme
Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding,4 that first threshold
was crossed. The Court rejected the partners' contention that ad1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1982) (stating that an employer may not "fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" or "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive . . . any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's . . . sex."); infra notes 139-48 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of gender discrimination).
2. See Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 65, 67 (stating that men continue to perceive women as childrearers and
that women "bring counter-productive expectations and perceptions to workplace"); Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace
Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1397-98 (1988) [hereinafter Women's Work] (authored
by Maxine N. Eichner) (noting that women's confinement to "pink collar" jobs results from
both intentional discrimination as well as job descriptions and structures calling for stereotypically masculine traits); cf. Note, When PriorPay Isn't Equal Pay: A ProposedStandardfor
the Identificationof "FactorsOther Than Sex" Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1085, 1085-86 (1989)[hereinafter PriorPay] (authored by Jeanne M. Hamburg) (stating that
women typically earn less than men in identical positions when hired because their new salaries are based on their previous salary histories).
3. See Note, Compensating Victims of PreferentialEmployment DiscriminationRemedies, 98 YALE L.J. 1479, 1494 & n.92 (1989) (stating that judicial enforcement of Title VII is
much stricter for low-skill jobs than for professional jobs).
4. 467 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1984) (Burger, C.J., per curiam)(concluding that this partnership decision was subject to scrutiny under Title VII).
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vancement to partnership is not within Title VII and concluded that
such a claim is cognizable under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The
war, however, is not won. As the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins6 indicates, although women can sue
under Title VII if they have been discriminated against when apply-

ing for admission to partnership, the grounds on which such a discrimination suit can be won and the rules of the fight are as yet

unclear.7 This, then, is the second threshold, the one women must
cross to make full use of Title VII in their quest for total equality in
the workplace. To clarify what legal precedents have been estab-

lished for women seeking equal access to the brass ring of partnership, this Article will examine how the United States Supreme Court

has dealt with this issue. Such an examination will make clear that
while women have crossed the first threshold leading to equal access
to partnerships, they are still struggling to cross the second

threshold.
II,

WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS

As stated earlier, while women are entering all of the profes-

sions and occupations in the American workforce, even career areas
previously seen as male bastions, they are not being allowed to progress to the highest levels of their chosen professions.8 Instead, a
"glass ceiling" often halts a woman's progress at a point in her ca5. Id. at 77-79.
6. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); see infra notes 173-217 and accompanying text (discussing
Hopkins).
7. 109 S. Ct. at 1775. Hopkins was a plurality decision which held that when a plaintiff
proves that gender played a motivating part in the employment decision, the defendant must
prove it would have made the same decision regardless of gender. Id. Justice O'Connor, however, wrote a concurring opinion which suggested a different approach. See id. at 1805 (suggesting that a plaintiff must first prove "that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor"
in an employment decision and then the burden shifts to the defendant to show the decision is
justified "by other wholly legitimate considerations"). Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, argued
that the Court should adhere to the established order of proof for disparate treatment cases
enunciated by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (maintaining that a plaintiff must first prove disparate treatment so that
an inference of discrimination arises, then the employer must articulate a legitimate reason for
its action, and finally, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion).
8. See Women's Work, supra note 2, at 1400 (noting that despite Title VII's commitment to workplace equality, courts have not used it effectively to confront entrenched conceptions of job requirements which exclude women).
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reer where she can see the top but is not allowed to reach it.' A case
in point is the plight of the woman attorney in today's marketplace.
Although the number of women lawyers has more than quadrupled
since 1970, so that women now make up approximately twenty percent of the legal profession, women are still discriminated against in
law firms today. 10 This discrimination is evidenced by the fact that
women are not rising through that "glass ceiling" to become partners in their law firms in numbers proportional to the their male
counterparts." In fact, the American Bar Association's Commission
on Women found that "decades after their entry into the big firms,
women make up a third or more of the associates but less then eight
percent of the partners."' 2 Worse still, the Commission concluded
that neither the increased number of women entering the legal profession nor the mere passage of time will necessarily eliminate the
barriers that currently stop qualified women attorneys from becoming partners.' 3 Obviously, the fact that women have not been represented in the legal profession in large numbers for as long as men
have been so represented, may partially explain the disparity
presented above. However, it does not, fully explain the difference.
Clearly, the woman attorney's difficulties in attaining equality
in her profession are most probably representative of the difficulties
facing women in comparable fields as they attempt to attain full professional development.' 4 It is also clear that Title VII has not as yet
9. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 68. The author sees the "glass ceiling" metaphor,
which suggests the existence of an invisible barrier set up by corporations to impede women's
progress to upper ranks, as misleading. Id. Ms. Schwartz suggests using a cross-sectional geo-

logical diagram as an appropriate metaphor. Id. She believes that "[t]he barrier to women's
leadership occurs when potentially counterproductive layers of influence on
women-maternity, tradition, socialization-meet management strata pervaded by the largely
unconscious preconceptions, stereotypes, and expectations of men." Id. These interfaces are
impermeable for women. Id.
10. See N.Y.L.J., Aug. 19, 1988, at 2, col. 3. See generally Gender Bias Committee,
Final Report of the Massachusetts Gender Bias Study: Gender Bias in Courthouse Interac-

tions, 74 MASS. L. REV. 50, 52-56 (1989) (providing several examples of how stereotypical
notions negatively affect female attorneys); Goldberg, Gender Bias, 74 A.B.A. J. 144, 144
(1988) (containing the ABA Commission on Women in the Profession findings that sex discrimination continues and that female attorneys have been systematically excluded from the
judiciary, law firm partnerships, and tenured faculty posts).
11. See Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gender
Equality, 57 FORDHAm L. REV. 111, 119-20 (1988); Marcus, Women Lawyers, Despite Suc-

cess, Say Sex Bias Hurt Their Careers, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1989, at B9, col. 5 (discussing a
survey of 900 women lawyers at large law firms which disclosed that 49 percent perceived that
promotion opportunities were better for men).
12.
13.

See Kaye, supra note 11, at 119.
Id.

14. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that management ranks will include more
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afforded these women the reality of equitable treatment in the
workforce.' 5
III. THE FIRST HURDLE: THENATURE OF PARTNERSHIP AND
PROMOTION DECISIONS

The fact that women have not been able to use Title VII to
protect themselves against job discrimination when applying for
partnerships is not for lack of trying. Unfortunately, the first attempts by women at litigating unfavorable partnership decisions
under Title VII were curtailed by judicial refusal to consider equal
access to partnerships as a protected area under Title VII.' a
Partnerships are a very popular form of doing business in the
United States. In fact, a recent count revealed that there are 1.7
million partnerships currently on record. 17 Firms providing professional services, such as law firms, engineering firms, accounting firms
and investment firms, commonly organize themselves as partnerships. Such firms most often hire young professionals in their fields
to work as associates for a set number of years, after which these
associates are promised that they will be considered for admission to
the partnership.' 8 The associates are employees, while the partners
are co-owners sharing liability, profits and losses, in the manner determined by their partnership agreement. 9 Because so many of the
professional firms are organized this way, it is clear why access to
these partnerships is critical to women's attainment of true professional equality. The history of the suits brought by women under
Title VII alleging sex discrimination in partnership decisions reveals
several basic issues impeding women's ability to make full use of
women, but questions remain as to how they will succeed, how high they will climb and how
long they will stay); cf. O'Brien & Madek, Pregnancy Discriminationand Maternity Leave
Laws, 93 DICK. L. REV. 311, 336 (stating that federal legislation providing for job preservation
during the period of pregnancy-related disibility is necessary to actualize equal employment

opportunities for women).
15. See Women's Work, supra note 2, at 1400 (discussing court limitations of the effectiveness of Title VII in confronting conceptions of job performance that exclude women).

16. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (finding Title VII inapplicable to the partnership selection process), affd, 678 F.2d
1022 (11 th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
17. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES

518 (109th ed. 1989).

18. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 71-72 (concerning a recent law school graduate who accepted a position as an associate after being told that advancement to partnership would follow
after five to six years of satisfactory work).
19. Id. at 75-76.
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Title VII in this area.
The first of these issues is that the nature of a partnership seems
to demand that the partnership association be congenial for all concerned. Indeed, the Uniform Partnership Act (hereinafter "UPA"),
the main source of partnership law in the United States today,
adopted in forty-nine states, characterizes the partnership relationship as a voluntary one.20 Pointing to another legal support for voluntary partnerships, defendant partnerships in Title VII suits have
consistently claimed as a defense the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of association.21 In turn, the courts have traditionally
respected the rights of partners to freely choose their co-owners and
have been reluctant to get involved in forcing partnerships to unwillingly accept a new partner.22 Articulating this judicial reluctance,
the district court that originally dismissed Elizabeth Hishon's complaint in Hishon v. King & Spalding, likened the professional partnership to a business marriage and so reasoned that applying Title
VII to coerce an unwanted partnership would too closely resemble a
23
statute for the enforcement of shotgun weddings.
In a concurring opinion to the Supreme Court's decision in
Hishon, Justice Powell felt the need to explain the rationale for protecting the voluntary nature of the partnership association. 2 He
spoke of the sensitive nature of the decisions shared by partners and
emphasized that the relationship among partners is not at all like the
relationship between an employer and an employee. 5 Justice Powell's concern gains more credence when one considers that each partner is jointly and severally liable for the negligent acts of any partner who is acting in the ordinary course of partnership business and
with the authority of his or her co-partners.2 6 In this context, forcing
the acceptance of an unwanted partner seems unfair to the existing
partners who must assume liability for the unwanted partner's actions. All of these sources emphasize the valid concern that to force
a partner on a group might undermine the ability of that group to
function as an effective management body.
These arguments are cogent ones. However, from a legal standpoint, they do not excuse partnership decisions that are based on dis20.

UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1984).
21. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 80 n4 (Powell, J., concurring).
22. See Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARv. L. REv. 457,
460-61 & n.24 (1980).
23. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1304-05.
24. 467 U.S. at 79-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 79-80.

26.

UNIF. PARTNERSIP

AcT, 6 U.L.A. 15(b) (Supp. 1984).
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criminatory motives. First, the UPA, an act which regulates partnerships at the state level, is preempted by Title VII, which regulates
employment decisions at the federal level 27 Second, Hishon v. King
& Spalding clearly renounced the First Amendment freedom of association defense in cases where discrimination, in fact, exists, stating that "'invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a
form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.' ",28 The Hishon Court addressed the possibility
that the First Amendment might indeed be the smokescreen obscuring an employer's real unwillingness to include women in a partnership and emphasized its refusal to allow the First Amendment to be
used in this way.29
As to the concern about unfairness to existing partners and the
possibility of preventing the partnership's effective functioning, it becomes apparent that Title VII is not structured to force partnerships
to accept a less qualified individual because of that individual's sex.
Rather, the mandate of Title VII is that an employer is not free to
consider an individual less qualified because of that person's sex.30
This distinction is made clear in Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, a
case involving the denial of summer employment to a female law
student by a law partnership. 31 In this case, the court stated that
"although a law firm is undoubtedly free to make complex, subjective judgments as to how impressive an applicant is, it is not free to
inject into the selection process the a priori assumption that, as a
whole, women are less acceptable professionally than men."'3 2 In
other words, the only impermissible reasons for disqualifying an employee for promotion to partnership under Title VII are illegal, discriminatory reasons. If an individual is careless or excessively pugnacious or is otherwise lacking in his or her merits, these
characteristics provide an appropriate basis for denial of partnership.
Thus, since Title VII would only require a partnership to accept a
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1982); Comment, Partnersas Employees Under
the Federal Employment DiscriminationStatutes: Are the Roles of Partnerand Employee
Mutually Exclusive?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 699, 729 n.186 (1988)(authored by Troy D. Ferguson) (stating that Title VII preempts state partnership laws where state law is contrary).

28.

467 U.S. at 78 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)).

29. Id. (noting that, although lawyers make distinctive contributions to the ideas and
beliefs of society, the defendant law firm failed to show that such a function would be inhibited

by requiring it to consider applicants on their merits rather than their gender).
30.
31.
32.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1982).
59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
59 F.R.D. at 521.
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qualified employee, compliance with Title VII's anti-discrimination
mandate when considering women employees for promotion to partnership should not hamper the ability of a partnership to function
effectively, nor should it unfairly increase the exposure of existing
partners to liability.33
A.

Can Partnersbe Employees?
Those who oppose the use of Title VII to prevent discrimination
in partnership decisions focus not only on the necessity for the association of partners to be a voluntary one, but also on the wording of
Title VII itself.3 4 Thus, the second issue always raised as a deterrent
to, applying Title VII's mandates to partnerships decisions, is
whether or not the wording of Title VII's key clauses precludes partnerships from such inclusion. In order to better understand this argument, it is necessary to examine the relevant clauses of Title VII.
These clauses state that it is unlawful for employers to engage in the
following practices:
(1). to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2). to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.3"
In addition, Title VII states that it shall be applicable only in an
employment setting where the employer has fifteen or more employees for each working day for at least twenty calendar weeks out of
the current or preceding calendar year.3"
An analysis of these provisions suggests two issues which have
been repeatedly raised relative to Title VII and partnerships. Both
issues involve the seminal question of whether a partner can ever be
considered an employee, since Title VII covers only potential or ac33. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1794-95 (1989) (finding that
accounting partnership promotion should be based on objective evaluations of a candidate
without regard to gender).

34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
35. Id.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e)(2) (1982).
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tual employment situations.5 7 The first issue, the less critical of the
two, is whether a partner can be considered an employee for the purpose of reaching the minimum number of employees necessary to
invoke Title VII. 38 The second issue, the more important one, raises
the question of whether a partner suing other partners can be disqualified from such a suit precisely because a partner is not an employee.39 This second issue leads directly to one of the main concerns
of this Article. If partners are considered owners, rather than employees, then admission to partnerships is not an employment situation covered by Title VII, but a voluntary association of co-owners
outside of Title VII's mandate.4 0 Indeed, this was a key claim made
by defendant partnerships before the Court's decision in Hishon v.
King & Spalding." In order to examine the obstacles to the definitive statement that partnership decisions are indeed covered under
Title VII, 42 it is necessary to examine the judicial history of the two
issues raised above.
The first context in which the question of whether partners can
ever be considered employees, is raised in cases seeking to establish
that a firm is large enough to be covered by Title VII. In stating that
only firms with fifteen or more employees for a substantial part of
the calendar year must comply with Title VII, Congress clearly intended to exempt small operations or firms with fewer human and
financial assets. Nevertheless, individuals have attempted to sue
firms of less than requisite size under Title VII 3 In these cases, the
plaintiff has often sought to have the partners in the firm classified
as "employees" since this was the only way in which the firm could
37.

See generally EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that

shareholders in a professional corporation engaged in the practice of law were not employees
under Title VII and the corporation was not an employer subject to Title VII because it em-

ployed less than fifteen nonshareholders); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that partners cannot be regarded as employees under Title VII).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
39. See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII suits between

partners).
40. See infra notes 59-79.
41. 467 U.S. 69, 77-78 (1984) (rejecting partnership's contention that Title VII categorically exempts partnership decisions from scrutiny); see also Note, supra note 3, at 1494 n.94
(discussing Hishon and how the plaintiff's burden of proof is the "relatively heavy" one involved in disparate treament cases).
42. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1781 n.1 (1989) (noting that the
Court currently reviews only decisions relating to advancement to partnership, rather than all
partnership decisions).

43. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text (discussing suits against small
businesses).
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be considered to be of the requisite size.4 In general, plaintiffs attempting this tactic have failed to prevail.45
In the two most notable cases to raise this issue, Burke v. Friedman" and EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd Ltd.,47 the courts rejected the
request that the partners be included in the count of employees, using the per se rule, which suggests that partners per se are not employees. 48 That is, by definition, partners are employers with hiring
and firing capabilities and have status as co-owners and managers
and thus are not employees. 49 This argument further states the truism that one cannot be an employer and an employee at the same
time. In Burke, the plaintiff, a non-partner accountant, instituted a
suit against the partners claiming sex-based employment discrimination.50 However, since the firm consisted of thirteen non-partners and
four partners, both parties agreed that Title VII's jurisdictional requirement of fifteen employees would be met only if the partners
were considered employees under Title VII.51 In hearing this case,
the district court adopted the per se rule described above to find that
partners were not employees for the purposes of Title VII.52 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concurred with the district
court's analysis and affirmed its decision, 53 thus laying the foundation for the judicial precedent that partners cannot be considered
employees for the purpose of applying Title VII.
In Dowd & Dowd, virtually the same issue was raised, except
that the defendant law firm was organized not as a partnership but
as a professional corporation in which the partner-like individuals
were defined as shareholders. 4 The EEOC claimed that the firm had
violated Title VII because of the way in which its health benefit plan
was structured. 55 Although Dowd & Dowd had fewer than fifteen
non-shareholder employees, the EEOC claimed that the Burke per se
44. See id.
45. See id.
46.

556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).

47. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
48. See generally Burke, 556 F.2d at 869-70 (finding that partners should be "regarded
as employers who own and manage the operation of the business").
49. Id. at 869.
50. Id. at 868.
51. Id. at 868-70.
52. Id. at 869-70.
53. Id.
54. Compare Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1177 (wherein the firm was organized as a
professional corporation) with Burke, 556 F.2d at 867 (wherein the firm was organized as a
partnership).
55. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1177-78.
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rule did not apply here, since Dowd & Dowd was a professional corporation, rather than a partnership like the defendant firm in
Burke. 6 However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court,
finding that the shareholders of Dowd & Dowd were not employees
and so the firm was too small to be covered by Title VII. 57 The court
noted that the structures of professional corporations and partnerships were much alike and that "[t]he role of a siareholder in a
professional corporation is far more analogous to a partner in a partnership than it is to the shareholder of a general corporation." 5
Thus, the court saw no reason to treat the shareholders in this case
differently than the partners in Burke. The Dowd & Dowd ruling
consolidated further the belief that partners could not be employees
under Title VII.
The second issue raised in the courts by the language of Title
VII, the issue of whether a partner can sue a fellow partner under
this statute, illustrates judicial adoption of more flexible criteria than
the per se rule of Burke for determining whether a partner is an
employee under Title VII. 59 The leading cases on this issue are
Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.6 0 and Wheeler v.
6 1 In the former case, Mr. Caruso had been a partner with
Hurdman.
the firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (hereinafter "Peat,
Marwick"). When he was fired,62 he claimed discrimination and
sued Peat, Marwick under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (hereinafter "ADEA").63 In turn, Peat, Marwick claimed that
since Caruso had been a partner at the time of his dismissal, he was
not an employee in an employment situation and thus not entitled to
sue under the ADEA.64 Instead of automatically applying the per se
rule that partners are not employees as the court did in Burke and
Dowd & Dowd, the Caruso court chose to look into the nature of
56.
57.
58.
(2d Cir.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
1986)

1178.
1178-79.
1178. But see Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Ass'n, 794 F.2d 793, 797-98
(rejecting the Seventh Circuit's analogy of professional corporations to

partnerships).
59. See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text (discussing suits under Title VII).
60. 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
61. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987).
62. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 146.
63. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) (stating that it is unlawful for employers
to discriminate in employment decisions because of an individual's age).
64. Compare Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 146-47 (wherein the employer alleged that a fellow partner was not an employee within meaning of the ADEA) with Burke, 556 F.2d at 867
(wherein partners were not considered employees).
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Caruso's position at Peat, Marwick. 5 The court used the traditional
indicia test to determine whether Mr. Caruso indeed possessed the
traditional characteristics of a partner in his firm.6 6 The attributes
used as the litmus test by the Caruso court were Mr. Caruso's ability to control and operate the business, his method of compensation
and the permanence of his work relationship. 7
The court in Caruso believed that a true partner maintains a
joint right of control of the business, receives a percentage of the
firm's profits as compehsation, and also remains a permanent member of the partnership except under exceptional circumstances. 6 Using these traditional indicia, the court decided that Mr. Caruso was
not a true partner but rather an employee and thus entitled to sue
under the ADEA.6 9 In explaining its rationale for rejecting the per
se rule that partners are not employees, the Caruso court stated that
the per se rule might tempt employers to evade the mandates of the
anti-discrimination statutes by labeling all employees as partners."0
In support of this view, the Caruso court cited Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon which states that "an employer may not
evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as
partners. ' 1
In Wheeler v. Main Hurdman the plaintiff, Marilyn Wheeler,
had been a partner in the international accounting firm of Main
Hurdman for one and one-half years when she was fired.7 2 She alleged that her dismissal was -because of her gender, inter alia, and
sued Main Hurdman under Title VII and several other anti-discrimination acts.7 As in Caruso, the district court decided that Ms.
Wheeler was not a partner but rather an employee and thus was
entitled to sue under Title VII, because of the "economic realities"
65.
title. Id.
66.
67.
68.

Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 146-50. The court was determined to go beyond the job
Id. at 148-50.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 149. See generally Comment, supra note 22, at 720-22 (discussing Caruso's

traditional indicia test).
69.
70.
71.

Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 148-50.
Id. at 146-48.
Id. at 147 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 n.2 (1984) (Powell,

J., concurring)).
72. 825 F.2d 257, 258 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987). Ms. Wheeler, a
certified public accountant, had been an associate for nine years prior to the time that she was
made partner. Id.
73. Id. Ms. Wheeler also sought relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) [hereinafter ADEA]; and the Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), which is a subsection of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). See id.
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underlying her relationship with the principals of Main Hurdman 4
In other words, she was lacking the traditional indicia of a partner,
as reflected in the economic realities of her position at Main
Hurdman. 75 Although the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court, rejecting the "economic realities" test in
this case, it suggested that the test could be appropriate in other
cases and that, while general partners are not employees, a partner
may qualify as an employee if the traditional indicia of partnership
status are lacking. 76 Thus, both the Caruso and Wheeler courts were
willing to entertain the possibility that persons termed partners
might, in reality, function in their firms more like employees and so
be entitled to protection from discrimination under Title VII and the
other discrimination acts.77
The judicial debate over whether partners can be termed employees indicates that for the purpose of determining if a firm is
large enough to be sued under Title VII, partners are per se not
employees, but for the purpose of claiming discrimination when being dismissed from a partnership, partners may be viewed as employees if they function more like employees than like partners within
their firms. However, the entire issue of whether a partner is an employee or not becomes irrelevant when considering whether an employee can sue over alleged discrimination concerning the decision
not to admit that employee to a partnership. Defendant firms, of
course, attempted to make the issue relevant by claiming that since
partners were not per se employees, admission to a partnership was
not an employment situation and, hence, was not covered under Title
78
VII. The Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding
eliminated this argument. For, while implying that true partners are
74.

Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 258.

75. See id. The district court concluded that while Ms. Wheeler was a partner, she was
also an employee for purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statutes, therefore the court
was bound to follow the "economic realities" test. Id. The district court agreed with Ms.

Wheeler that her work remained unchanged after being made partner, in that she managed
the same client load and support staff, and was supervised by the same department head. Id. at
261.
76. Id. at 276-77. The court expressly rejected the "economic realities" test in "bona

fide general partner situations," but suggested that the test might be acceptable in situations
where the plaintiff is "clearly placed' in a different economic and legal category from general

partners. Id. at 276.
77. See generally id. at 267-68 (finding categorical absolutes difficult to sustain in this
area of law); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)

(wherein the court found the plaintiff to be an employee for purposes of the ADEA since he
had almost no control over operation of the business and was not considered a permanent

member of the firm).
78.

467 U.S. 69 (1984).
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not employees, the Hishon Court also decided that this is not the
relevant issue to be examined. 79 To better understand the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Hishon, one must first examine the facts and
judicial progress of the case.
B. Hishon v. King & Spalding; Title VII Regulates Partnership
Decisions
Elizabeth Hishon accepted a position as an associate at the Atlanta law firm of King & Spalding in 1972.80 The firm, organized as
a general partnership, was then composed of approximately fifty
partners, fifty associates and more than fifty other clerical and
paralegal employees."' Ms. Hishon, pursuant to the normal course of
events at King & Spalding, was considered for partnership in May
1978, at the end of her sixth year of employment as an associate
with the firm. 2 Since she was not invited to join the partnership, in
accordance with the firm's "up or out" policy, *she was extended a
reasonable period of time to secure other employment prior to termination. 83 Ms. Hishon applied for reconsideration eight months after
the negative decision, but was again denied partnership at the firm's
May 1979 meeting.8 4 She left the firms's employ on December 31,
1979.85 Ms. Hishon filed a timely sex discrimination suit with the
EEOC on November 19, 1989, alleging, inter alia, that the respondent firm discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in its
decision to deny her a partnership position.88 The EEOC issued a
Notice of Right to Sue within ten days, which right Ms. Hishon asserted in district court within the requisite ninety-day period.8 7 Her
complaint alleged sex discrimination with respect to the firm's decision not to make her a partner, a violation of the Equal Pay Act 8
and a breach of contract.8 9
The district court dismissed Ms. Hishon's complaint, using the
previously cited argument, that forcing an unwanted partner on a
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id. at 71.
81. Id..
82. Id. at 71-72.
83. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S.
69 (1984).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1024-25.
87. Id. at 1025.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1) (1982).
89. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1025.
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partnership was like forcing a shotgun marriage by law. 90 The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court to dismiss Ms. Hishon's complaint. 91 The court concluded
that Title VII does not apply to decisions concerning partnerships
because partners are not employees under Title VIP and that the
opportunity to be considered for promotion to partner is neither a
"term, condition or privilege of employment," protected by section
703(a)(1) nor an "employment opportunity" protected by section
703(a)(2)." In response to the plaintiff's argument that she was denied "employment opportunities" by the firm's "up or out" policy,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the termination was a result of the
partnership decision and thus lost its separate identity as a cause of
action under Title VII.9 4 The court further stated that the plaintiff
"assumed the risk" that a negative decision concerning promotion to
partnership would set in motion the termination procedureY.5
Thus, the district and circuit courts used the arguments previously analyzed to disqualify King & Spalding's partnership decision
from coverage by Title VII. The district court used the freedom of
association argument, 96 and the circuit court argued that, since partners were not employees and admission to partnerships was not an
employment opportunity, partnership decisions were exempt from
the mandates of Title VII.97 The Supreme Court, however, reversed
98
the Eleventh Circuit.
In its decision, the Court held that Ms. Hishon's complaint
stated a claim cognizable under Title VII.99 The Court noted that
the underlying employment relationship between Ms. Hishon and
King & Spalding was contractual, and thus the "terms, conditions or
privileges of employment"' 100 included benefits that are part of an
employment contract, including an alleged promise to consider an
employee for partnership. 01' Where an employee can prove that the
parties contracted to have that employee considered for partnership,
90. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1304-05 (N.D.
Ga. 1980), aft'd, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
91. 678 F.2d at 1030.
92. Id. at 1027-28.
93. Id. at 1028.
94. Id. at 1029.

95. Id. at 1029-30.
96.
97.
98.

Hishon, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1304-06.
Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1026-30.
Hishon, 476 U.S. at 69.

99. Id. at 78.
100.
101.

Id. at 74; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
Hishon, 476 U.S. at 74-75.
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Title VII requires that the consideration be non-discriminatory.102
Even though an employer would be able to eliminate a privilege attached to the employment relationship (e.g., the opportunity to be
considered for partnership), where the privilege exists, it must be applied consistently with Title VII. 0 3 If an associate can prove that a
firm used the prospect of ultimate partnership to induce prospective
associates to join the firm, this finding supports the determination
that partnership consideration was a term, condition or privilege of
employment under Title VII. 04

Again, responding to King & Spalding's argument that the elevation to partnership entails a change in status from "employee" to
"employer," the Court held that the benefit a plaintiff is denied need
not be employment to fall within Title VII's protection; it need only
be a term, condition or privilege of employment.105 The Court attributed no significance to the fact that employment as an associate necessarily ends when the associate becomes a partner because a benefit
(e.g., a pension benefit) need not accrue before a person's employment is completed to qualify as a term, condition or privilege of that
employment. 08 The Court cited Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore" 7 for the proposition that nothing in the change in status
that advancement to partnership might entail means that partnership
consideration falls outside the terms of the statute. 0 8 In its decision
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 76.

105.

Id. at 77.

106.
107.
108.

Id.
425 Supp. 123, 128-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Hishon, 476 U.S. at 77; see Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 125. Plaintiff Lucido was a

white, Catholic male of Italian ancestry who brought suit against a large New York law partnership, alleging that he was unlawfully discriminated against as an associate, and that his

employment was unlawfully terminated because of his national origin or religion or both. Id.
The complaint alleged that Mr. Lucido was discriminated against with respect to work assignments, training, rotation and outside work opportunities, as well as being denied promotion to

partner because of his national origin or religion or both. Id. at 127. The district court in
Lucido ruled that the opportunity to become a partner was a "term, condition or privilege of

employment" and an "employment opportunit[y]" within the meaning of Title VII. Id. at 128.

The district court interpreted section 703(a) of Title VII as indicating "a Congressional intent
to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms and to include the entire scope of the
working environment within the Act's protective ambit." Id. at 126. The Lucido opinion analogized the case before it to the situation where an employee who is protected by the National

Labor Relations Act, is denied a promotion to a supervisory position (a position which would
no longer provide the individual with NLRA protection) because of discrimination in violation
of the NLRA. Id. at 128-29; see NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir.

1953); accord Golden State Bottling Co., v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 188 (1973). In Bell Air-

craft, the Second Circuit held that such an employee was protected from discrimination in
violation of the NLRA because "[a]t the time that the discrimination took place he was

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss2/1

16

1990]

Women
Denied
Partnerships
Madek and O'Brien:
Women
Denied
Partnerships: from Hishon to Price Waterhouse v. Hop

in Hishon, the Supreme Court ended the debate over whether partnership decisions fall within the purview of Title VII.' 0 9 The critical
factual issue became whether consideration for partnership was a
term, condition or privilege of the original employment contract
made with the partnership.1 0 The Hishon opinion is legally correct,
well-reasoned and follows from the clear language of Title VII. Further, Title VII contains no exceptions for professional level employment decisions and there is nothing in its legislative history which
excludes professionals or other individuals with high-level positions
from its protection."' Indeed, the legislative history reveals the opposite to be true, that Congressional intent was to include professional level positions within the coverage of Title VII." 2 Partnerships
are specifically included as "persons" subject to the strictures of Title VII.
Thus, Hishon clarified an essential point. By clearly stating that
partnership decisions must be made on a fair and equal basis without
regard to the applicant's sex, the Court vaulted women across the
first hurdle on their way to truly equal career opportunity.1"3 With
regard to women passing through that "glass ceiling" to the top of
the career ladder, the issue would no longer be a semantic debate
over whether freedom of association prevails or whether partners are
employees. Rather, it would be assumed that Title VII was meant to
protect people from discrimination in partnership decisions just as it
was meant to prevent them from discrimination in entry level employment decisions and that a woman's right to be considered on a
fair and equal basis in such decisions would be protected by law. The
first threshold had been crossed.
clearly a protected employee, and his prospects for promotion were among the conditions of his
employment." 206 F.2d at 237. As the Supreme Court noted in Hishon, certain sections of
Title VII are patterned after the NLRA and thus the Court frequently refers to cases interpreting analogous language. 476 U.S. at 76 n.8.

109. See 476 U.S. at 69 (holding that partnership decisions fall within the scope of Title
VII).
110. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 274.
111. See.Note, supra note 22, at 460; see also EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F.
Supp. 175, 179-80 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (discussing the legislative history of Title VII supporting
the court's assertion of jurisdiction in cases involving sex discrimination in a law firm); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
112. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sass., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2138. See generally Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. at 179-80 (proposed exclusion of professional employees defeated in Senate); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e & nn.
458-59 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
113. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 75-76.
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IV.

THE SECOND HURDLE-CAUSATION AND THE BURDEN OF

PROOF

Once the Court established in Hishon that consideration for
partnership, when clearly a "term, condition or privilege of employment," was protected under Title VII, 114 the battle for women's
equality at the top of the career ladder entered murkier waters. The
next problem was successfully challenging discrimination in the actual decision-making process.1 5 Since the decision to admit an individual to a partnership is usually a highly complex one, involving
both objective and subjective factors, and is often a collaborative decision made by many individuals, rooting out the "real cause" of
such decisions is often impossible.' 6 This fact is apparent when one
traces the judicial history of the second major case to be examined in
this Article, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins."' Ann Hopkins was refused admission to the Price Waterhouse partnership and alleged
that this partnership decision involved sex discrimination. 1 8 Representative of the problem in analyzing partnership decisions to deter-

mine causation, Price Waterhouse is a mixed-motive case." 9 That is,
there were many reasons why Price Waterhouse refused to admit
'Ann Hopkins to its partnership, some of which were legal and some
of which were discriminatory. 20 To understand what protection Title
VII has afforded women affected by such "mixed motive" partnership decisions, it is necessary to look briefly at the findings of the
district and appellate courts in this case and then at the key issues
114. Id. at 73, 74, 78-79 (concluding that Hishon's complaint stated a cognizable claim
under Title VII).
115. See infra notes 185-232 and accompanying text (discussing causation and burden
of proof in Hopkins).
116. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1781-83 (1989)(assessing Hopkins's candidacy for partnership as labored and secretive). See generally Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (concluding that disparate impact analysis can
be applied to a subjective or discretionary promotion system).
117. 109 S.Ct. at 1775.
118. Id at 1780-81. Justice Brennan joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens wrote this important decision. Id. at 1780. Justices White and O'Connor both filed concurring opinions. Id. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined. Id.
119. Id. at 1780-81. When the partners refused to reconsider Ms. Hopkins for partnership, she sued Price Waterhouse under Title VII claiming discrimination "against her on the
basis of sex in its decision regarding partnership." Id. at 1781.
120. Id. at 1781-83. The Court reviewed evidence submitted to the district court by both
sides. Id. It noted that the partnership legitimately evaluated such traits as rainmaking ability
and ability to meet deadlines. Id. It also noted, however, that the partners reacted negatively
to Ms. Hopkins simply because she was a woman and they let this interfere with their decisionmaking. Id.
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highlighted in the Supreme Court's decision.
The facts of this case clearly outline the problem at hand. Ann
Hopkins, a senior manager at Price Waterhouse, a national accounting firm included in the "Big Eight", 21 applied for promotion to
partner.122 Ms. Hopkins was very successful at obtaining new business for Price Waterhouse, having generated more new business for
the firm than any of the other nominees being considered for partnership with her.12a However, Ms. Hopkins was also known to be
demanding, brusque and impatient with her staff, as well as a difficult person to work for.' 24 In short, there were reasons to make her a
partner and reasons to refuse her admission to the partnership,
In its usual manner, Price Waterhouse solicited comments from
its partners about whether or not Ann Hopkins, the only female candidate in a pool of eighty-eight partnership applicants, should be admitted to the partnership. 2 5 Of the six-hundred-sixty-two partners
at Price Waterhouse, thirty-two of them submitted evaluations and
comments concerning Ms. Hopkins' candidacy. 26 Thirteen partners
27
recommended that Ms. Hopkins be admitted to the partnership.1
Three partners wanted her nomination to be put on hold. 2 Eight
abstained, stating that they had no basis for an opinion, and eight
recommended that her nomination be rejected. 129 The Policy Board,
following the Admissions Committee's recommendation, decided to
place Ms. Hopkins' nomination on hold because of reservations
about her interpersonal skills.'i3
121.

As of May, 1989, the "Big Eight" included: Arthur Andersen & Co.; Arthur

Young & Co.; Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte, Haskins & Sells; Ernst & Whinney; Peat,
Marwick, Main & Co.; Price Waterhouse; and Touche, Ross & Company. See Greising, The
New Numbers Game in Accounting, Bus. WK., July 24, 1989, at 20-21 (discussing the need
for cost cutting as driving six of the "Big Eight" to merge). There is, however, an industrywide consolidation at this time. Id.
122. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1780-81. Ms. Hopkins worked in the firm's Wahington,

D.C. office for five years prior to this time. Id.
123. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The district court

found that Ms. Hopkins out performed all other partnership candidates in securing major contracts for Price Waterhouse. Id.
124. Id. at 1113, 1117. The court found that evaluations of both supporters and opponents of Hopkins, contained remarks about her lack of interpersonal skills. Id.
125. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1781.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1781, 1782. Although the partners perceived some improvement in Ms. Hopkins' interpersonal skills, her "perceived shortcomings in this important area eventually

doomed her bid for partnership." Id.
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When Ms. Hopkins later lost the support of two partners who
originally supported her nomination, the partners at Price
Waterhouse decided not to re-propose her for nomination to the
partnership.13 ' Ms. Hopkins resigned from Price Waterhouse in
1984.132 After pursuing administrative remedies to no avail, Ms.

Hopkins filed suit against Price Waterhouse in federal district court
alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.133
A.

The District-Court

The district court found that Ms. Hopkins "presented a prima
facie case under Title VII" by showing that she was a member of a
protected group, that she was a qualified partnership candidate, that
she was refused admission to the partnership, and that Price
Waterhouse continued to seek partners with her qualifications.",
The court found, however, that the motives for rejecting Ms. Hop35
kins partnership bid were indeed mixed.1
On the one hand, the court found that the partners' concerns
over Ms. Hopkins' interpersonal skills were legitimate, not pretextual, and that her management style justified the Policy Board's decision to place her candidacy on hold. 36 Responding to Ms. Hopkins'
contention that Price Waterhouse treated her differently than certain
male nominees with interpersonal skills problems, the court concluded that the male nominees referred to by Ms. Hopkins did, in
truth, possess other positive attributes which distinguished their situations from that of Ms. Hopkins.' Thus, the court suggested that
131. Id. at 1781 n.l. A refusal to repropose a candidate for admission to partnership
amounts to a constructive discharge. Id.
132. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1113.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (providing the model for a
prima facie showing of discrimination); see also infra notes 272-85 and accompanying text
(discussing this model further).
135. 618 F. Supp. at 1119-20. Judge Gesell noted that discriminatory stereotyping was
permitted to play a part in the selection process. Id. at 1120.
136. Id. at 1114, 1116. The court noted that Price Waterhouse has consistently placed a
high premium on candidates' interpersonal skills in an effort to promote cordial relations
within an office. Id. at 1116. Price Waterhouse's records indicated that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguishing Ms. Hopkins and other candidates. Id. at 1115.
137. Id. The court agreed with Price Waterhouse, which argued that these male candidates could be differentiated from Ms. Hopkins. Id. The firm had a specific, special need for
the male candidates' skills which the firm felt it would lose unless they were promoted to
partner. Id. Additionally, these male candidates received fewer negative comments from evaluators, and those that they did receive were less intense than the negative comments directed at
Ms. Hopkins. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss2/1

20

1990]

Madek and O'Brien:
Women
Denied
Partnerships: from Hishon to Price Waterhouse
v. Hop
Women
Denied
Partnerships
277

Ms. Hopkins' management style, in and of itself, was a legitimate
reason for putting her partnership application on hold.' 8
On the other hand, however, the court found that Price
Waterhouse was liable because the partnership selection process it
used was unacceptable under the mandates of Title VII.'3 9 The district court pointed out that its finding of liability rested "on its determination that Price Waterhouse had discriminated against Ms. Hopkins by filtering her partnership candidacy through a system that
gave great weight to negative comments and recommendations, despite evidence that those comments reflected unconscious sexual stereotyping by male evaluators based on outmoded attitudes toward
40
women."
A look at the suspect comments referred to by the court makes
clear their discriminatory nature. For example, one partner stated
that "she may have overcompensated for being a woman.' 4' Another partner claimed that she needed a "course at charm school.' 42
Still another, attempting to defend her candidacy, remarked that
Ms. Hopkins had changed and had become a "much more appealing
lady partner candidate."' 43 More damning still, the head partner in
Ms. Hopkins' office, her strongest supporter and the person responsible for explaining to her the problems the Policy Board had with her
candidacy, advised Ms. Hopkins that she would improve her chances
of becoming a partner if she would "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
' 44
hair styled, and wear jewelry.'
In assigning liability, the district court found that Price
Waterhouse took no action to discourage the stereotyping or to sensitize its partners to the dangers of sexism. 4 5 Further, the court found
138. Id.at 1116.
139. Id. at 1120 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1982)).
140. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 464. Price Waterhouse admitted that it gave heightened significance to negative comments and votes. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1115-16. The court found
that the Policy Board assigned great weight to negative comments even though some of the
partners had very little contact with Ms. Hopkins. Id. at 1118; cf Divila, The Underrepresentationof Hispanic Attorneys in Corporate Law Firms, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1423
(1987) (discussing the problem of stereotyping in regard to people who have different backgrounds and exploring the theory that the dominant group is prone to interact with those most
similar to themselves, while maintaining unconscious negative feelings toward the members of
the minority groups).
141. 618 F. Supp at 1116-17; see infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing sex
stereotyping).
142. Id.at 1117.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.at 1118-19. The court concluded that the firm failed to articulate a policy
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that Price Waterhouse's evaluation process. gave "substantial
weight" to the negative comments about Ms. Hopkins without attempting to determine if the comments in question were tainted by
gender-based stereotypes. 4 6 Evaluations given by Price Waterhouse
partners in previous years about women nominees showed the same
type of bias, and this confirmed that the Price Waterhouse evaluation system was tainted by discriminatory stereotyping. 47 Finally,
the -district court found that the testimony of an expert witness, Dr.
Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, supported Ms. Hopkins' contention that the comments in question were the product of sex
stereotyping.' 4 8
In addressing the issue of causation, the district court found
that a plaintiff need only prove that sex discrimination played a role
in an employment decision to be entitled to relief. 4 9 At this point,
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that the decision would have been the same
absent discrimination.'1 0 Rather than the preponderance of evidence
standard most commonly used in tort litigation, the district court determined that Price Waterhouse should be held to the more stringent
clear and convincing standard.' 5' To justify this decision, the court
stated that in a mixed-motive case, the benefit of the doubt must
favor the employee "so that the remedial purposes of Title VII will
not be thwarted by, saddling an individual subject to discrimination
with an impossible burden of proof."' 152 The court found that Price
Waterhouse did not, provide clear and convincing evidence that its
decision would have been th6 same without the discriminatory motive. 53 The two elements of the district court's decision highlighted
here, causation and burden of proof, are pivotal concerns when examining how Title Vii protects women from discriminatory partnership decisions. As such, they "were examined again by the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court.
against sexual discrimination or bias even in the face of clear gender stereotyping. Id.
146. Id. at 1119. The court found that Price Waterhouse maintained a system which
allowed evaluations based upon outmoded attitudes to be determinative. Id.
147. Id. at 1117. Gender stereotyping appeared as "part of the regular fodder of the
partnership evaluations." Id.
148. Id. Although Dr. Fiske, an expert witness called by Ms. Hopkins, concluded that
the stereotyping played a major part in the partnership decision, she could not say to what
degree it influenced the process. Id.
149. Id. at 1120.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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B.

The Court of Appeals

When Price Waterhouse appealed this decision to the court of
appeals, that court upheld, for the most part, the district court's
judgment on the issues of causation and burden of proof.154 In fact,
one of the bases on which Price Waterhouse appealed was on the
issue of causation.1 55 Price Waterhouse contended that the district
court's finding of liability was incorrect because Ms. Hopkins did not
establish a causal link between the partnership's sexist comments
and its decision to put her candidacy on hold. 56 Further, the firm
claimed that, since Ms. Hopkins failed to demonstrate the precise
effect that the sexist comments had on the firm's ultimate decision,
no discriminatory motive was established.157 The court of appeals rejected Price Waterhouse's claims for two reasons. First, the court
pointed out that the argument about precise causation was not on
point since the lower court relied on the partners' sexist comments
only as evidence of a tainted selection process, not as proof that Ms.
Hopkins' nomination was held over because of gender. 58 Then, the
court pointed out that the circuit courts had divided on whether the
plaintiff in a Title VII case must establish that the impermissible
discrimination was the predominant motivating factor in an employment decision or simply establish that it was a substantial factor. 5 '
Thus, Price Waterhouse's claim that precise causation must be established was not supported by judicial precedent. The court further
stated that requiring a plaintiff to establish precise causation would
place an extreme burden on Title VII plaintiffs who challenge the
60
employment decisions of collegial bodies such as partnerships.
Price Waterhouse raised another issue related to causation when
it contended that there was a lack of competent evidence that its
partnership selection process was tainted by impermissible stereotyping. 61 The firm's intent here was to challenge the competence of Dr.
154. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 473.
155. Id. at 465.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 468. Price Waterhouse contended that since Ms. Hopkins failed to prove that
any unconscious stereotyping actually caused her partnership denial, the firm could not be
liable under Title VII. Id.
158. Id. at 467-68.
159. Id. at 470 n.8. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has never
ruled definitively on causation, and that the circuit 'courts were divided. Id. at 469-70.
160. Id. at 469.
161. Id. at 466. Although many of the comments describing Ms. Hopkins were made by
supporters, the court nevertheless agreed with the district court that the comments reflected
stereotypical thinking in violation of Title VII. Id.
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Fiske, the expert witness who testified that the partners' comments
revealed the presence of sex stereotyping. 162 In addressing this issue,
the court noted that in the past it had exercised a narrow standard of
review in Title VII cases, overturning the district court's findings
only where those findings were "based on an utterly implausible account of the evidence. ' 163 The court held that, in this case, with or
without the testimony of Dr. Fiske, the sexist meaning of the comments was quite clear to any observer, and they were evidence that
the firm's selection process evaluated women nominees based on
their sex. 164 Thus, there was no basis on which to overturn the findings of the district court.
Again, Price Waterhouse claimed that, since many of the arguably sexist comments were made by partners who actually supported Hopkins's candidacy, no negative inferences could be drawn
from these comments." 5 The court of appeals disagreed and found
that, to the contrary, the stereotypical comments made by Ms. Hopkins' supporters were "competent evidence that sexist attitudes were
present in the partnership selection process. '"16

Still addressing the issue of causation, Price Waterhouse
claimed that Ms. Hopkins had the burden of proving intentional discrimination by the firm. 67 The court, however, found that while
"[p]roof of discriminatory motive is crucial,

. . .

the Supreme Court

has never applied the concept of intent so as to excuse an artificial,
gender-based employment barrier simply because the employer involved did not harbor the requisite degree of ill-will towards the person in question." 68 The court further found that the fact that some
of the partners at Price Waterhouse *may have been unaware of a
162.

Id. at 466 & n.3.

163. Id. at 465 (quoting Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).

164. Id. at 466. The court noted that the sexist import of the many comments was "patently clear." Id.; see Cohen, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Mixed Motive Discrimination
Cases, the Shifting of the Burden of Proof and Sexual Stereotyping, 40 LAB, L.J. 723, 727

(1989) (discussing illegitimate factors and stereotypical comments tainted by sexism).
165. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 466 n.3. The court of appeals noted that the favorable comments made by her supporters nevertheless reflected stereotypical thinking. Id.
166. Id. at 466. The court concluded that the supporters, by "couching their qualifications in terms of sexual stereotypes . . .echoed the complaints of Hopkins' critics, thereby
lending credence to those complaints and unwittingly undermining the support they sought to
provide." Id. at 466 n.3.
167. Id. at 468. Price Waterhouse claimed that it was not liable since Ms. Hopkins
failed to prove intentional discrimination. Id.
168. Id. at 468. The court emphatically rejected Price Waterhouse's contention stating
that "unwitting bias or ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradication than blatant
or calculated discrimination." Id. at 469
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discriminatory motive within themselves neither alters the fact of its

existence nor excuses it. In short, Ms. Hopkins established the existence of a discriminatory motive by showing that she was treated

differently because of her sex.'
As to the second key issue raised by this case, burden of proof,

the court of appeals again agreed with the district court. That is, the
court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that Ms. Hopkins

met her burden by proving that gender was a significant factor in
her failure to make partner. 1 ' The court noted that Price

Waterhouse's claim that it had a legitimate reason for putting Ms.
Hopkins' nomination on hold in no way negated Ms. Hopkins' showing that sexual stereotyping played a significant role in the firm's

decision.' The court affirmed the district court's finding that, once
Ms. Hopkins proved this, the burden of proof shifted to Price
Waterhouse to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the contested employment decision would have been the same absent the

illegal factor. 1 2 In so deciding, the Hopkins court reiterated the prevailing opinion among circuit courts, which have addressed the question of causation in mixed-motive cases, that "once a Title VII plain-

tiff has demonstrated by direct evidence that discriminatory animus
played a significant or substantial role in the contested employment

decision, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the decision
would have been the same absent discrimination."' a The only signif169. Id. at 469. The court thereby condemned both overt and subtle forms of employment discrimination. Id.
170. Id. The court noted that there was "ample support" for the district court's conclusion that stereotyping played a significant role in denying Ms. Hopkins' bid for partnership. Id.
171. Id. at 470. The court stated that the question is not whether Ms. Hopkins was
treated less favorably because of gender but rather whether such treatment caused the adverse
employment decision. Id.
172. Id. at 471. Once a Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated evidence of significant discriminatory animus, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer. Id. at 470-71.
173. Id. at 470-71. There are subtle variations on the burden of proof in Title VII cases.
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits require the plaintiff to demonstrate that but
for gender, the decision would have been favorable. See McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n
Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 914 (1988); Peters v.
City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 930 (1988);
Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1035 (1986); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365-66 (4th Cir.
1985).
The First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that once the plaintiff proves that
discriminatory motives played a substantial part, the employer may avoid liability only by
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even
absent the discrimination. See Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 714-15 (2d Cir.
1988); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 936-37 (Ist Cir. 1987); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court
of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715
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icant difference between the district court's opinion and the court of
appeals' opinion relative to the defendant firm's burden of proof is
that the district court viewed an employer's fulfillment of the "clear
and convincing" standard only as a means of avoiding the obligation
to provide Ms. Hopkins with equitable relief, whereas the court of
appeals viewed the meeting of this standard as
a means of totally
1 74
VII.
Title
under
liability
of
finding
a
avoiding
Thus, both the district court and the court of appeals, having
heard the arguments in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, agreed that a
plaintiff need not establish precise causation to prove unlawful discrimination in a partnership decision, but need only establish that a
discriminatory motive was a significant factor in the decision. 175
Both courts also agreed that, once the plaintiff has proven by direct
evidence that an illegal motive played a significant part in the decision, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the
partnership decision would have been the same without the illegal
motive. 176 In addition, both courts also found that the appropriate
burden of proof in such cases was the clear and convincing standard. 1 " However, when the Supreme Court decided Price
Waterhouse8 v. Hopkins, it resolved these issues with less
17
unanimity.
C. The United States Supreme Court
The Court heard Hopkins issuing a plurality opinion which
represented the views of four justices, as well as two singular concurring opinions and a dissenting opinion, representing the views of
F.2d 1552, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). The District of Colum-

bia Circuit follows this rule, but requires the employer's proof be elevated to clear and convincing evidence. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
re'vd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The Ninth Circuit also requires employers proof to be clear and

convincing. See Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (9th Cir.
1984). The Eighth Circuit requires the employer's proof to be a preponderance of the evidence.

See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); cf. Shaw, Watson v. Ft.
Worth Bank and Trust: New Evidential Standardsfor Disparate Impact Analysis, 40 LAB
L.J. 347, 349-52 (1989) (discussing modified burdens of proof and production in the 1988

Supreme Court opinion of Watson, involving disparate impact analysis and the conflicting interpretations among the circuit courts prior to the issuance of this decision).
174.
175.

Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 470-73.
Id. at 470-71.

176. Id.; infra note 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing varying approaches to
this issue).
177.

Id. at 471-72. The court thereafter concluded that Price Waterhouse failed to

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that impermissible bias was not the determinative factor in denying partnership status to Ms. Hopkins. Id. at 472.
178.

109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
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three justices.'

Women

79

The plurality agreed with the lower courts' ap-

proach to causation and burden shifting, but concluded that they
erred in requiring Price Waterhouse to prove its case using the clear
and convincing standard.1 80 Rather, the plurality stated, Price

Waterhouse should only have been required to prove its case by the
preponderance of evidence standard. 181 Thus, the judgment was reversed in part and remanded for retrial to determine whether Price
Waterhouse could prove its case by a preponderance of evidence. 82

Justice White's concurring opinion differed as to the method by
which the defendant should bear its burden of proof, while Justice
O'Connor's concurrence defined a more stringent causation standard
and a more complicated formula for burden shifting. 8 ' The dissent,
on the other hand, found that a much stricter standard of causation
was required under Title VII than that proposed by the plurality and
that, furthermore, the ultimate burden of proof must always remain

with the plaintiff rather than shift to the defendant.184 To gauge ac179. 109 S. Ct. at 1780. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion in which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. Justices White and O'Connor each filed separate concurring
opinions. Id. at 1795-96. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Id. at 1806.
180. Id. at 1792-93. The Court agreed with the lower courts that once a plaintiff proves
that gender played a motivating part in the employment decision, the defendant may avoid
liability only by showing that the decision would have been the same absent such discrimination. Id. at 1787-88. The Court concluded that the better rule as to level of proof was the
preponderance standard since the rules of civil litigation apply in Title VII cases. Id. at 1792.
181. Id. at 1791-93.
182. Id. at 1793. The district court will determine whether "Price Waterhouse had
proved by a preponderanceof the evidence that it would have placed Hopkins' candidacy on
hold even if it had not permitted sex-linked evaluations to play a part in the decisionmaking
process." Id. (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 1795-96. (White, J., concurring). Justice White disagreed with the Court's
requirement that the employer submit objective evidence, and argued that proof is ample when
an employer credibly testifies that "the action would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone." Id. at 1796.
Justice O'Connor suggested a different approach. Id. at 1796-1806 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor urges that the plaintiff must "produce evidence sufficient to show that
an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor . . . such that a reasonable factfinder could
draw an inference that the decision was made 'because of' the plaintiff's protected status." Id.
at 1805. Once the plaintiff proved this, the defendant would have the burden to prove that its
decision was justified by "wholly legitimate considerations." Id.
184. Id. at 1806-14 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent cautioned against a departure
from the existing Title VII framework for this isolated case. Id. at 1806. Justice Kennedy
reiterated the order of proof for Title VII disparate treatment cases. Id. at 1809. The dissent
stated that "once plaintiff presents a prima facie case, an inference of discrimination arises.
The employer must rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for its action. The final burden of persuasion, however, belongs to the plaintiff." Id. See generally Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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curately the current and probable future level of protection afforded
by Title VII to women seeking admission to partnerships, it is necessary to examine the Court's varying views on standard of causation
and burden of proof.
1. Causation.-When analyzing causation in Title VII cases,
courts look to the clause from Title VII which mandates that no
unfavorable employment decision can be made against an employee
' The problematic words
"because of such individual's . . . sex." 185
here are the words "because of." Do these words imply strong causation, where the discriminatory employment decision would not have
taken place "but for" the illegal motive, or do they imply merely
that the discriminatory motive must be a contributory factor to the
decision? None of the opinions in Hopkins claim that the discriminatory motive must be the sole cause of the adverse partnership decision to trigger partnership liability, but they do stake out positions
on differing points along this causation spectrum."'
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, argues that "because of"
in this context does not require "but for" causation. 8 7 The plurality
reasoned that, since the phrase "because of" does not, in any logical
context, mean "solely because of," it is clear that, in mixed-motive
cases, that decision is "because of' legitimate and illegitimate considerations.'88 Thus, if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant
partnership relied on a sexually discriminatory motive in making its
partnership decision, the burden of proof shifts to the partnership.1 8
185.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982); see also Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory

Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1114,
1114-15 (1988) (authored by Marina C. Szteinbok) (stating that the direct evidence is generally unavailable for plaintiffs alleging discrimination).
186. See infra notes 187-232 and accompanying text (discussing the causation
requirement).
187. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1784-86 (construing "because of" as a substitute for "butfor" causation is misunderstanding the language of Title VII). Justice Brennan criticized this
construction of the "because of" language, noting that it is merely a hypothetical concept. Id.
at 1785. Finally, Justice Brennan rejects any requirement that the plaintiff prove the "precise
causal role," and concluded that it is sufficient to "prove that the employer relied upon sexbased considerations in coming to its decision." Id. at 1786. But see id. at 1808-09 & n.2
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing that the "but-for" causation is the substantive standard
under Title VII); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976)
(stating that "no more is required to be shown than that . . . [discrimination prohibited by
Title VII] was a 'but-for' cause.").
188. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1785.
189. Id. at 1787-88 (stating that at the point the defendant may avoid liability by "proving it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a
role.").
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Since such a formulation stops short of saying "but for" sexual discrimination, the employment decision would have been different.
In applying this interpretation to Ms. Hopkins, the plurality
concluded that the plaintiff in a mixed motive case need only "prove
that the employer relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to
its decision," rather than proving the exact causal role of permissible
and impermissible factors in the decision process. 190 In this context,
the plurality found that the evidence presented by Ms. Hopkins was
sufficient to establish an actionable claim under Title VII.191 However, the plurality specified that, by focusing on the rather direct
evidence presented by Ms. Hopkins, it was not implying "a limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision.' 92 Commenting further on
the issue of causation, Justice Brennan, speaking for the plurality,
agreed with the lower courts that some of the comments made by the
Price Waterhouse partners were indicative of sex stereotyping, but
cautioned that stray remarks based on sexual stereotypes do not always establish that gender was "a motivating factor" in an adverse
employment decision.' 9 To be successful in a Title VII suit, Justice
Brennan concluded, a plaintiff must show that the employer actually
relied on her gender in making its decision."'9
The plurality further explicated their view on when gender constitutes a "motivating factor" that was "relied on" in an employment
decision. If one of the reasons an employer decides not to admit a
woman to a partnership is because she is a woman, then gender is a
motivating factor. 95 Again, if an employer bases this decision on
sex stereotypes, such as the stereotype that a woman cannot or must
not be aggressive, gender is a motivating factor in that decision. 96
The plurality points out that an employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait effectively places
women in an "impermissible Catch-22," of the type prohibited by
97
Title VII.1
Both Justice White and Justice O'Connor, in their respective
190. Id. at 1786.
191. See id. at 1792-95.
192. Id. at 1791; cf.Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989)
(wherein the plaintiffs attempted to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact based

upon statistics).
193. Id. at 1790-91.
194.

Id. at 1795.

195. Id. at 1790.
196.

Id. at 1790-91.

197. Id. at 1791.
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concurring opinions, suggest that, for a Title VII plaintiff to succeed
in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the plaintiff must
show that sex discrimination played a "substantial" role in the adverse partnership decision.198 While Justice White declined to become involved in what he views as a semantic argument over the
precise meaning of "but for" causation, 99 Justice O'Connor addresses this issue directly, and it is her concurring opinion which demands analysis. In particular, she disagrees with the plurality's conclusion that the words "because of" do not mean "but for"
causation. *00 She states that the Court should not and need not deviate from the interpretation of the statute which finds the two phrases
to be synonymous. 20 ' Justice O'Connor further points out that, in her
view, the plurality's misreading of the words "because of" in the
statute apparently led it to conclude that if a decisional process is
"tainted" by awareness of sex or race in any fashion, the employer
has violated Title VII.2 °2 However, Justice O'Connor believed that
Congress hinged liability under Title VII on a determination that the
consideration of an illegal factor caused a tangible employment injury of some kind.20 3 Thus, Justice O'Connor argued that in order to
justify shifting the burden of proof on causation to the defendant
partnership, the plaintiff must show disparate treament through direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in
the decision.20 4 Both Justices White and O'Connor agreed with the
plurality when they stated that Ann Hopkins met this standard of
causation so that the burden of proof properly shifted to Price
Waterhouse.205
However, Justice O'Connor, in particular, believed that Ann
Hopkins succeeded in meeting an even more stringent standard of
causation than the plurality demanded because "but for" the dis198. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1795 (white, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 1795.
200. Id. at 1796-97. Justice O'Connor urged the Court to remain within the framework
it had carefully established. Id. at 1797. See generally Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
801-03 (1973); supra note 185, at 1119-22 (discussing order of proof in Title VII cases).
201. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1797 (stating that legislative history shows Congress meant
"because of" to mean "but-for"). But see id. at 1785 & n.7 (noting that Congress specifically
rejected the "but-for" language implying that the two phrases are not synonymous).
202. Id. at 1804. The plurality, Justice O'Connor contended, effectively negated the causation requirement of Title VII. Id.
203. Id. at 1803-04.
204. Id. at 1803. Justice O'Connor requires that the explicit consideration of a forbidden
criterion such as gender play a "substantial role in a particular employment decision." Id.
205. Id. at 1795-96.
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criminatory motive, Ms. Hopkins had a reasonable chance of being
admitted to the partnership.2 0° Ms. Hopkins showed that negative
sex stereotyping was a substantial factor in Price Waterhouse's decision regarding her candidacy for partnership.207 The plurality suggested that while Ms. Hopkins presented direct evidence of the partnership's discriminatory motive, this should not be construed to
suggest that discrimination could not be proven in other ways sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.20 ' In direct disagreement, Justice O'Connor believed that the plaintiff must provide
direct evidence of the substantial discriminatory motive if the burden
of proof is to shift to the defendant. Thus, while agreeing that Ms.
Hopkins did prove her case, the plurality and Justice O'Connor disagreed about what causal and evidentiary standards can be extrapolated from this case for use under Title VII.
The dissent in Hopkins, written by Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, appeared to agree with
Justice O'Connor on the necessity of "but for" causation.209 The dissent, however, unlike Justice O'Connor, asserted that Ms. Hopkins
failed to meet this standard and that, since the district court had
found that sex discrimination was not a "but for" cause of Price
Waterhouse's decision in Ms. Hopkins' partnership bid, the judgment should have been against the plaintiff and in favor of Price
Waterhouse.21 0 The dissent embraced a more stringent notion of
what "but for" causation requires than did Justice O'Connor.211 Justice Kennedy also disagreed with the district court finding that, on
the one hand, Ms. Hopkins failed to prove that sex discrimination
was a "but for" cause of the adverse partnership decision and, on the
other hand, Price Waterhouse's reliance on negative sex stereotyping
as part of the decisional process made it liable. 12
In delineating their view of the proper standard of causation
206.

Id. at 1804-05.

207.

Id.

208. Id. at 1791.
209. Id. at 1807. Justice Kennedy remarked that "it is clear that.

.

.Title VII liability

requires a finding of but-for causation." Id.; see also id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that "because of" is synonymous with "but-for"). But see id. at 1785 (construing the

two phrases as synonymous is to misunderstand them).
210. Id. at 1814.
211. Id. at 1807. Justice Kennedy asserted that Title VII is concerned with decisions
directly resulting from impermissible motives. Id. Justice O'Connor agreed that a claim was

actionable when the impermissible motives amounted to a "substantial factor." Id. at 1804-05.
212. Id. at 1813-.14. Justice Kennedy cautioned that a claim based on negative sex stereotyping is not actionable under Title VII, because the ultimate question is "whether discrimination caused the plaintiffs harm." Id. at 1813.
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under Title VII, the dissent interpreted the "because of" phrase in
Title VII as Congress's way of indicating that proof of liability
under Title VII requires a showing that race, color, religion, sex or
national origin caused the negative decision.21a To support this position, Justice Kennedy noted that the words employed by the Supreme Court in prior Title VII decisions "are synonymous with 'but
for' causation. 214 Furthermore, the dissent observed that the "but
for" standard is necessary because Title VII is "not concerned with
the mere presence of impermissible motives," but rather is concerned
with the employment decisions that result from those motives.2 15 The
dissent asserted that "[i]f a motive is not a 'but for' cause of an
event, then, by definition, it did not make a difference to the outcome."2 16 Hence, the dissent concluded that any standard less than
the "but for" analysis simply represented a decision to impose liability without causation. 17
The dissent criticized the plurality's contention that, since the
words "because of" do not mean "solely because of," a "but for"
standard of causation is not applicable to Title VII cases. 18 To support this challenge, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the issue of
sole causation is a "separate question from whether consideration of
' Justice Kennedy
sex must be a cause of the decision."219
also noted
that no one contends that sex must be the sole cause of a decision
before there is a Title VII violation. 220 Rather, the dissent contended
that sex discrimination must be "merely a necessary element of the
set of factors that caused the decision, i.e., a but for cause."21
Thus, on the issue of causation, there appear to be three views:
the view of the plurality that the discriminatory motive must simply
have been relied on in Price Waterhouse's decisional process; 222 the
view of Justice O'Connor that the discriminatory motive must play a
substantial part in the partnership decision;2 23 and the view of the
dissent that the discriminatory motive must be a cause of the adverse
213.

Id. at 1807; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).

214. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1807. See generally McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (requiring, under Title VII, the but-for standard for
causation).
215. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1807.
216.

Id.

217. Id.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 1808 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1786.
Id. at 1804.
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employment decision.224 The plurality dismissed the need for "but
for" causation because it viewed such causation as synonymous with
sole causation. 225 Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, stressed the
importance of a "but for" standard of causation but appeared to define that standard less stringently than the dissent did.22 6 Thus, it

would appear that the Court has not yet adopted a definitive rule on
the degree of causation required for a successful Title VII suit relative to an adverse partnership decision. While Justices White and
O'Connor seem to have staked out a middle ground on causation in

claims, it is unclear where their votes might fall in future
Title VII
22 7
cases.
Whatever standard of causation is employed, once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the
relevant issue becomes which party shall bear the ultimate burden of
proof. 228 When discussing this issue, as it is treated in Hopkins, one
must have as a frame of reference four previous Supreme Court

cases which appear to establish two different legal precedents. One
of these precedents, set in Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle229 and affirmed in NLRB v. Transportation Management, Corp.,2 30 is espoused by the plurality and the
other, established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green231 and reaffirmed in Texas Department Community Affairs v. Burdine,3 2 is espoused by the dissent. Justices White and O'Connor, as discussed,
224. Id. at 1813.
225. Id. at 1785 & n.6.
226. Id. at 1805. Justice O'Connor contends that an actionable claim arose when Ms.
Hopkins offered direct evidence that the defendant placed substantial negative reliance on illegitimate criteria. Id. The dissent, however asserts that the inquiry is whether the discrimination caused the employment decision at issue. Id. at 1813.
227. Id. at 1796-1806 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 1795, 1805, 1809-10. The plurality contended that once this plaintiff proves
illegitimate criteria were used in an employment decision, the defendant "may avoid a finding
of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same decision" absent the gender issue. Id. at 1795. However, the plaintiff retains the burden
of persuasion. Id. at 1788.
229. 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (discussing the allocation of the burden of proof).
230. 462 U.S. 393, 400 (1983) (where an employer's burden was likened to an affirmative defense).
231. 411 U.S. 792, 801-07 (1973) (stating that the order and allocation of proof requires complainant to establish primafacie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to an
employer to articulate legitimate reason for decision).
232. 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) (noting that plaintiff's prima facie case creates an
inference of discrimination which an employer may rebut with evidence of a legitimate reason
for dismissal, although the ultimate burden of persuasion belongs with the plaintiff to demonstrate that the preferred reason was not the true reason for the dismissals).
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staked out a middle ground.
2. Plurality Opinion.-In examining Mount Healthy and

Transportation Management, the cases the plurality claim are appropriate precedents, one sees a clear statement relating to plaintiffs'

burden of proof. 33 In Mount Healthy, the plaintiff, a school teacher,
claimed that he had been fired because he exercised his First
Amendment right of freedom of speech. 34 Once the plaintiff proved
that this protected conduct, freedom of speech, was a motivating fac-

tor in his employer's decision to discharge him, the employer was
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have reached the same decision regarding the plaintiff without the
presence of the protected conduct.23 5 Again, in TransportationMan230
agement, the Court reiterated this burden shifting precedent.
Here, the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Board's interpretation of section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act.2 37
The provision held that, once a union member has shown that adverse treatment by the employer was partially motivated by the employer's dislike of unions, the burden shifted to the employer to prove
that the adverse treatment would have occurred absent the
discrimination.238
The plurality in Hopkins, modeled its decision on Mount
Healthy and Transportation Management.239 Although Mount
233. Compare NLRB v. Transpbrtation Management, Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400-01
(1983) (per curiam) (stating that the burden of proving unfair labor practices rests with
NLRB General Counsel who must prove that the employee's conduct was not a substantial or
motivating factor in the discharge) with Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977) (per curiam) (stating that the plaintiff must first prove
that the protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor behind the discharge, and then
the employer must rebut the inference by showing that the same decision would have been
reached even in the absence of the plaintiff's conduct).
234. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 276. The plaintiff also alleged violations of his fourteenth amendment rights. Id.
235. Id. at 287.
236. 462 U.S. at 403. The Court disagreed with the employer's contention that such an
allocation of proof contravenes established procedure. Id. at 403-04 n.7. Therefore, if the
plaintiff carries the burden of proving that protected conduct played a role in the discharge,
then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it would have reached the same decision
regardless of the conduct. Id.
237. Id. at 400-04 & nn. 5-6 (stating that the Court was unprepared to hold the
NLRB's position that the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer, an impermissible construction of the Act even though such construction was not required under the Act). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) (providing that violations may be adjudicated only upon a
preponderance of evidence) and 29 C.F.R. § 101.10(b) (1989) (providing the general counsel
has the burden of proving violations of section 8 of the NLRA).
238. TransportationManagement, Corp., 462 U.S. at 400-02.
239. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1784-95; cf. TransportationManagement, Corp., 462 U.S.
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Healthy was a First Amendment case involving a public employee
and TransportationManagement was an NLRA case, the plurality

reasoned that the facts in Hopkins were similar enough to warrant a
similar burden shifting.2 4 Thus, the plurality concluded that the

lower courts had been correct in shifting the burden of proof to Price
Waterhouse after Ms. Hopkins established that sexual stereotyping

was a motivating factor in the adverse partnership decision.24 ' However, the plurality preferred to refer to this burden shifting as an

opportunity for Price Waterhouse to provide an "affirmative defense."242 The plurality reasoned that, since Ms. Hopkins carried the
burden of proving that sex was a motivating factor in the employment decision, the call for Price Waterhouse to show that the outcome of the decision was unaffected by the sex stereotyping was not

a question of burden shifting. 43 Rather, Ms. Hopkins carried the
burden of proof to *establish causation, and Price Waterhouse, if it
wished to prevail, had the burden of proof that the illegal causation
did not, in fact, change the outcome of the decision.244 It is of interest to note that the dissenting justices claimed that here the plurality
is demanding of the defense proof of the same "but for" causation
which it held was unnecessary for the plaintiff. 45 The plurality further commented that, since Price Waterhouse's decision was, in part,
illegally motivated, fairness dictated that the firm "bear the risk that
the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated. 2 46
The plurality affirmed the position of the circuit court that Price
at 393; Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274; see supra notes 229-38 and accompanying text
(discussing these cases).
240. 109 S. Ct. at 1792-93 (noting that Mount Healthy and Transportation Management are cases which most resemble Hopkins).
241. Id. at 1787-88 (stating that once the plaintiff proves that gender played a motivating part in the employment decision, the defendant may avoid liability only by proving that it
would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play a role).
242. Id. at 1788. If the plaintiff persuades the factfinder on one point, for the employer
to prevail the defendant must persuade the factfinder to believe another. Id. The Court commented that this balancing of burdens is a result of Title VII's balancing of rights. Id.; cf.
Transportation Management, Corp., 462 U.S. at 400.
243. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1788.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1806-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that whoever bears burden of
proof in Title VII cases must show but-for causation).
246. Id. at 1790 (quoting TransportationManagement, Corp., 462 U.S. at 403).
Because the evidence of discrimination was so overwhelming in Hopkins, the plurality
unreservedly applied the burden shifting analysis. 109 S. Ct. 1787-88. In closer cases, however,
the Justices may be more reluctant to shift the burden of persuasion. See Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
at 1804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (maintaining that there should be a requirement that
would require direct and clear evidence of discriminatory treatment before the burden would
shift, implying that circumstantial evidence is insufficient).
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Waterhouse could avoid a finding of liability altogether if it prevailed in its burden of proof.24 7 The Justices held that the issue of
liability under Title VII was not concluded when the plaintiff demonstrates that sex was a factor in the employment decision. 24 8 Thus,
employers will not be liable if they can prove that, even if they had
not taken gender into account, they would have come to the same
decision regarding a particular person.2 49 In affirming the court of
appeals' position on this issue, the Court rejected the district court's
finding that liability under Title VII was determined when Ms. Hopkins proved that sex stereotyping was a motivating factor and that,
when Price Waterhouse assumed the burden of proof, the most it
could accomplish was to avoid the obligation to provide Ms. Hopkins
with equitable relief.2 50 In offering its rationale for upholding the
court of appeals' decision, the plurality pointed out that Title VII
attempts to balance the rights of an employee to be treated equitably
against the rights of an employer to freedom of choice regarding its
employees. 2 5 I To best preserve this balance, the defendant must be
able to avoid a finding of failure to comply with Title VII by establishing that the employment decision in question was one which the
defendant had a right to make, a decision based on an employer's
legitimate prerogatives rather than on illegal motives.2 52
When considering how an employer might avoid liability under
Title VII, the plurality disagreed with both the district court and the
court of appeals on the standard of proof which the defendant must
meet upon assuming its burden of proof.2 53 Both lower courts held
Price Waterhouse to the elevated clear and convincing standard, 25"
while the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard was the
usual civil standard of a "preponderance of the evidence. 25 5 In ex247. Id. at 1783-84 (stating that the court of appeals had the right approach but "erred
in requiring the employer to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence.").
248. Id. at 1787-88.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1783 (wherein the district court noted that the employer "could avoid equitable relief by proving through clear and convincing evidence that it would have placed Hopkins'
candidacy on hold even absent this discrimination.").
251. Id. at 1786; see supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's allocation of benefits and burdens).
252. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1786-88. But see id. at 1809 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Title VII order of proof requires the plaintiff to present a prima facie case of
discrimination, then an employer may rebut such inference, but the final burden of persuasion
belongs to the plaintiff to show that the employer intentionally discriminated).
253. Id. at 1783-84 (rejecting both lower courts' requirement of the clear and convincing standard).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1792.
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plaining this decision, the plurality noted that the "[c]onventional
rules of civil litigation generally apply to Title VII cases. . .and one
of these rules is that parties to civil litigation need only prove their
case by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 56 Again, the Justices
pointed out that exceptions to the preponderance of the evidence
standard are rare and that the clear and convincing standard usually
"serves as a shield [for defendants] rather than, as Hopkins seeks to
use it, as a sword [for the plaintiff]. '"25

Thus, because the lower

courts had required Price Waterhouse to prove its innocence by
meeting a standard of proof which was too stringent, the Court reversed the court of appeals on this issue and remanded the case to
determine if Price Waterhouse could meet its burden of proof using
the preponderance of the evidence standard.258
As to the kind of evidence which an employer must present to
successfully bear its burden of proof, the plurality found that "the
employer should be able to present some objective evidence as to its
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive." 59 The
Court stressed that, in a mixed-motive case, such as Hopkins, an
employer will not prevail "by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of
the decision."2 60 That is, the employer must convince the Court that,
at the time of the decision, the employer's legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision. 6'
Thus, the plurality found that, in Title VII litigation of the type
discussed here, the appropriate case models are Mount Healthy and
TransportationManagement. 62 The burden shifts to the defendant
once the plaintiff proves that the defendant relied upon an illegal
motive in making the employment decision in question.26 a The plu256. Id.
257. Id. The Court noted that the clear and convincing standard in Title VII cases is
related to the relief requested rather than to the initial determination of liability. See generally
29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(2)(c) (1989) (providing that if the EEOC finds "the record contains

clear and convincing evidence that, although discrimination existed at the time selection for
promotion was made, the employee would not have been promoted even absent discrimination,
the agency shall eliminate any discriminatory practice and ensure it does not recur.").
258. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1793.
259. Id. at 1791 (wherein the plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on

gender in making its decision); cf. id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that the
plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that an illegitimate criterion was used). But see id. at

1796 (White, J., concurring) (finding "no special requirement that the employer carry its burden by objective evidence.").
260. Id. at 1791 (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).

263. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing burden of proof).
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rality further asserted that, when it assumes the burden of proof, the
defendant must meet this burden with objective evidence that meets
the preponderance of the evidence standard in order to prevail. 264
Thus, the plurality mandated that Price Waterhouse be given an opportunity to prove that it did not violate Title2 65
VII, using this formulation to govern the shift of burden of proof.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White agreed with the plurality that Mount Healthy and TransportationManagement were the
appropriate legal precedents for the Hopkins case.266 Thus, Justice
White felt that the burden of proof appropriately shifted to Price
Waterhouse, after Ms. Hopkins presented a prima facie case.2 8 7 Justice White also agreed that Price Waterhouse should have been held
to the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than to the
clear and convincing standard.2 68 However, Justice White differed
from the plurality regarding the type of evidence that the defendant
should be required to produce once the defendant has assumed the
burden of proof. Specifically, Justice White disagreed with the plurality's apparent requirement that, in order to avoid Title VII liability, "the employer [must] submit objective evidence that the same
result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation. 2 6 9 In
contrast, Justice White believed that "[i]n a mixed motive case,
where the legitimate motive found would have been ample grounds
for the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this
should be ample proof."2 70 Here, Justice White seems to suggest
that, to preserve the employer's right to freedom of choice in employment decisions, it should not be held to too stringent a standard,
not only in terms of the overall weight of the evidence produced, but
also in terms of the kind of evidence produced.271
3. Dissenting Opinion.-In framing its comments on the burden of proof in Hopkins, the dissenting Justices relied upon the second set of cases referred to above, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green272 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur264. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1791-92.
265. Id. at 1793.
266. Id. at 1795-96 (1989) (White, J., concurring).

267. Id.
268. Id. at 1796.
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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dine.17 - The dissent pointed out that these were cases decided under
Title VII.2 74 On the other hand, Mount Healthy275 and Transportation Management, 76 used by the plurality as precedents on burdenshifting, were, respectively, First Amendment and NLRA cases, decided under different mandates from those of Title VII.2 7" Thus, McDonnell Douglas and Burdine are, in the view of the dissent, the
7
cases of choice for Title VII precedent.1
As might be assumed, these cases provide a different model for
assigning burden of proof than do Mt. Healthy2 79 and Transportation Management. 80 Under Burdine,28 ' the plaintiff must first present a prima facie case: proof of membership in a protected class, or
participation in a protected activity, qualification for promotion, rejection for promotion and employer's continued solicitation of applicants with similar qualifications.2 8 Once this has been established an
inference of discrimination arises.28 Then, it is the defendant's burden to produce evidence of a legitimate motive for rejecting the applicant and rebut the inference of discrimination raised by the prima
facie case. 284 Under B
Burdine, however, the final burden of persuasion
remains with the plaintiff to prove that the employer's allegedly legitimate motive is a pretext to cover the real motive, intentional discrimination.2 85 Thus, under Burdine, the burden of proof never shifts
to the defendant, but remains at all times with the plaintiff.
Justice Kennedy believed that this was the framework most ap273. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
274. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1809-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
Court should adhere to the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine analysis for disparate treatment
allegations).
275. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
276. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
277. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1811 (stating that the plurality's new approach follows
Mount Healthy and Transportation Management even though the context in Hopkins is
different).
278. Id. at 1806, 1809 (stating that these two cases represent precedent for Title VII
disparate treatment cases).
279. See supra note 233-35 and accompanying text (discussing Mount Healthy's approach to the burden of proof).
280. See supra note 236-38 and accompanying text (discussing TransportationManagement's approach to burden of proof).
281. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
282. Id. at 252 & n.6.
283. Id. at 253.
284. Id. at 254. To avoid liability, the employer must articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection. Id.
285. Id. at 356. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1981) (wherein the burden of persuasion never shifts).
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plicable to Hopkins.286 The dissent argued that the plurality's decision to shift the burden of proof in mixed motive cases did not provide sufficient refinement to legal theory vis-a-vis Title VII to justify
the confusion it would create in the judicial system.281 Since it would
not apply to all Title VII cases, but only to that small subset of cases
whose plaintiffs offered direct evidence of a substantial discriminatory motive, the dissent argued that the difficulties in evaluating the
strength of the plaintiff's evidence and determining whether to shift
the burden of proof are not justified.2 88 To emphasize even further
the limited benefits of this burden shifting scheme, the dissenting
Justices pointed out that burden shifting makes a real difference to
outcome only in that even smaller subset of cases where the "evidence is so evenly balanced that the factfinder cannot say that either
side's explanation of the case is more likely. ' 289 Only in such cases
will the defendant, by bearing the burden of proof, assume a real
"risk of non persuasion" as a result of harboring an illegal motive in
an employment decision.290
For the plurality, the decisive factor in choosing Mount Healthy
as the model for assigning burden of proof in mixed motive cases
was the kind of evidence the plaintiff presented to prove the existence of discrimination. 9 ' In its dismissal of Burdine as the appropriate framework for assigning burden of proof in Hopkins, the plurality claimed that it is solely a "pretext" case, so that a plaintiff in
a mixed motive case, where there is objective evidence, rather than
inferential evidence, of the presence of a discriminatory motive, will
be disadvantaged by having to "squeeze her proof into Burdine's
framework."2 92 Although forcing the plaintiff to carry the burden of
proof throughout the trial is meant to protect the employer's freedom of choice regarding employees, the plurality stated that employers merit this benefit only in cases where the plaintiffs proof is solely
286. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1806.
287. Id. at 1811-12 (noting that the potential benefits of the plurality approach are
overstated).
288. Id. at 1812.

289. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote that the plurality's approach is not applicable to "cases
in which the allocation of the burden of proof will be dispositive because of a complete lack of
evidence on the causation issue. Id.
290. Id.

291. Id. at 1788-89 & n.12 (discussing the evidentiary scheme). But see id. at 1812
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the Hopkins analysis is only applicable to very limited
facts).
292.

Id. at 1788. The plurality observed that the premise in Burdine is that "either a

legitimate or an illegitimate" set of motives was present. Id.
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inferential. 293 Where the proof is direct, the plurality found the employer forfeits this deference to its rights.294
On the other hand, the dissent believed that the framework provided by Burdine is flexible enough to protect the balance of rights
between employer and employee, both in cases in which the plaintiff's proof is direct and in those in which the proof is inferential.295
The dissent claimed that the Burdine framework "is hardly a framework that confines the plaintiff; still less is it a justification for saying
that the ultimate burden of proof must be on the employer in a
' Rather, "Burdine compels the employer to
mixed motive case."296
come forward with its explanation of the decision and permits the
plaintiff to offer evidence under either of the logical methods [direct
'
or inferential] for proof of discrimination."297
Thus, the rights of
both parties are protected under the Burdine framework.29s As precedent for this proposition, the dissent pointed to United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, a case where a black man
provided direct evidence that he had been passed over for promotion
because of discriminatory reasons.2 99 In spite of the extraordinary
evidence, the Aikens Court adhered to the Burdine framework in
deciding the case. 300
Thus, the dissent used Burdine to argue strongly that the burden of proof must remain with the plaintiff in a Title VII suit, no
matter what the nature of the discrimination.30 ' Perhaps the heart of
this argument for the dissenting Justices is their determination to
carry out what they see as the intent of Congress to prevent employers from being found liable under Title VII for stray remarks heard
in hallways or for other discriminatory thoughts or attitudes that do
not result in discriminatory employment decisions." 2 To make cer293.

Id. at 1788-89. Here, however, the plaintiff's proof was objective. Id.

294. Id. at 1789-90.
295. Id. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (establishing that the McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine framework are appropriate) (emphasis added).
296. Id. Justice Kennedy supported the framework in Burdine, calling it an orderly and
adequate way to hear the case. Id.

297. Id.
298. Id. But see id. at 1788-89 (wherein the plurality opinion cautioned that not all
disparate treatment cases may be "squeezed" into the Burdine framework).
299. 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 n.2 (1983).
300. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1810-11. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the application
of the Burdine framework in this instance).
301. Id. (stating that the Burdine analysis is flexible enough to apply to any disparate

treatment claim).
302. Id. at 1807 (stating that Title VII is concerned with impermissible employment
decisions rather than the mere presence of impermissible motives).
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tain that employers are held liable only for discriminatory acts, the
dissent argued that they should be presumed innocent until proven
guilty and that this can only be accomplished by requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof throughout the case. 03 This is in
contrast to the plurality's opinion that an employer who harbors discriminatory animus places itself in jeopardy by violating the spirit of
Title VII and so, if the plaintiff proves the presence of this animus in
an employment decision, the employer deserves to bear the burden of
proving that the discriminatory animus was inconsequential to the
decision. 0 4 The dissent, on the other hand, asserted that the Court's
primary duty is to make certain that employers are not penalized
merely for discriminatory animus, and therefore they would force
the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving that the discriminatory
animus actually resulted in an adverse employment action. 30 5
4. Middle Ground.-As with the issue of causation, Justice
O'Connor appears to have chosen a middle ground.3 80 She agreed
with the plurality that the burden of proof must shift to the defendant in a case such as Hopkins, where there is direct evidence that a
discriminatory motive played a substantial role in the partnership
decision.30 7 She also agreed that, once the burden of proof has
shifted to the defendant in such a case, the defendant should have to
prove its innocence under the preponderance of evidence standard
and that meeting such a standard of proof should allow the defendant to avoid liability altogether.308 Agreeing with the plurality, Justice O'Connor wrote that this burden shifting is justified because,
once "a disparate treatment plaintiff show[s] by direct evidence that
an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision," the
employer is no longer entitled to a presumption of good faith in its
employment decisions which is accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination.309 At this point, the employer
may be required to convince the factfinder that, despite the smoke,
there is no fire.3 10 Justice O'Connor appears to share with the plural303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1809-10 & n.3.
1787, 1790.
1809, 1813-14 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1796-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

307. Id. at 1796.
308. Id. (stating that the employer must prove it would have made the same decision
absent considerations regarding the candidate's gender).
309. Id. at 1804 (stating that where the plaintiff made a strong evidentiary showing, the

trier of fact was entitled to assume that discriminatory animus contributed to the outcome).
310. Id. (suggesting that stray remarks in the workplace, while probative, cannot satisfy
the plaintiff's burden of proof).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss2/1

42

1990]

Madek and O'Brien:
Women Denied Partnerships: from Hishon to Price Waterhouse v. Hop
Women Denied Partnerships

ity the feeling that, once the existence of discriminatory animus has
been shown, the employer must bear the risk of not being able to
prove that this animus did not result in discriminatory action."' l
Justice O'Connor, however, shares the dissent's concern that
employers not be penalized merely for harboring illegal thoughts.3 12
Again, Justice O'Connor voiced concern about "the danger of forcing employers to engage in unwarranted preferential treatment" of a
protected group to avoid prosecution under Title VII.3 13 Although
this concern for the balance of rights under Title VII is shared by
both the plurality and the dissent, Justice O'Connor offers a different
model.
Justice O'Connor argued that any Title VII suit should initially
adhere to the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework to structure
the presentation of evidence. 14 The plaintiff must first establish the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdineprima facie case described above. 15 At
this stage, the plaintiff should also present direct evidence of discriminatory motives at work in the decision making process.316 When
the plaintiff has presented this evidence, the defendant employer
should present its case, including whatever direct evidence it may
have of legitimate motives for the employment decision in question. 7 Once all the evidence has been presented, using Burdine as
the model, Justice O'Connor recommended a totally different scheme
for assigning burden of proof than does the plurality or the dissent.318 Justice O'Connor stated that at this point the Court should
assess the evidence to determine if the plaintiff has met the Price
Waterhouse threshold, that is, direct evidence that the discriminatory animus played a substantialpart in the employment decision.319
If so, the Court should shift the burden of proof to the defendant
employer.320 If not, the plaintiff should bear the burden of persuasion
311.

Id. at 1804-05. Justice O'Connor agreed with the approach adopted by the plural-

ity. See id. at 1787-88 (plurality opinion).
312. Id. at 1804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor agreed with the dissent. See id. at 1807 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that Title VII requires more than the
mere presence of impermissible motives).
313. Id. at 1804.
314. Id. at 1805; cf. id. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (setting forth the order of
proof in disparate treatment cases under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdineanalysis).

315. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1805 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1787-88.
Id. at 1797-88.
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that the employment action was "because of" discrimination. 2 ' Justice O'Connor asserted that "such a system is both fair and workable
and it calibrates the evidentiary requirements demanded of the parties to the goals behind the statute itself." 22
V.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, Justice O'Connor is concerned, as are all the Justices,
with distinguishing frivolous suits from legitimate suits, and more
subtly, suits where the discriminatory animus is very real, but not
causative, from suits where the animus is not only real but also causative. 23 This attempt to preserve a balance between the employee's
rights and the employer's rights goes to the crux of the problem
women have faced in using Title VII to gain equal access to the halls
of power. It is legitimate to be concerned that federal law not intrude on a private employer's right to decide whom to promote, but
it is also legitimate to require that such an employer not allow personal prejudices to negatively impact into employment decisions regarding innocent parties. Walking the line between these two outcomes is a difficult balancing act indeed.
Although the United States Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 4 attempts to walk this line, several factors
combine to limit the predictive value of this decision for future female litigants attempting to use Title VII to rectify a discriminatory
partnership decision. First, the four opinions offer views on causation
and burden of proof which fall at widely diverse points on any logical spectrum. 25 Second, four Justices supported the plurality opinion, 26 three supported the dissenting opinion 27 and two wrote concurring opinions. 28 Such a numerical breakdown indicates that it
will be difficult to predict which way future decisions might go, particularly since Justice O'Connor shows strong affinity with both
321.

Id. at at 1805 (using the principles set forth in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine).

But see id. at 1785 (wherein the plaintiff argued and the plurality agreed that the but-for

causation test is inapposite to this disparate treatment case).
322. Id. at 1805.
323. See id.
324.

109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).

325. See id. at 1780 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 1795 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at
1796 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 1806 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
326. See id. at 1780 (containing Justices Brennan's plurality opinion as supported by
'Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens).
327. See id. at 1806 (containing Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion as supported by
Chief Justice Rehniquist and Justice Scalia).

328. Id. at 1795 (White, J.,
concurring); Id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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points of view. 29 In light of these two factors, one can hardly say
that Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins is the definitive case which will
launch women onto a new plateau in their fight for equality. Neither
is this the decision that sets the crusade for equality in the workplace
back to the 1950's. Rather, Hopkins may be seen as the first decision to wrestle with the very complex issues that are raised when a
woman questions the legitimacy of a partnership decision. It gives
these issues credence and thus puts women in a better position to
challenge such decisions in the future. The opinion further clarifies
that subjective criteria will be analyzed along with the traditional
objective evaluations relative to employment decisions violative of Title VII's prohibition against discrimination. 330
Women were better served by Title VII after Hishon, which acknowledged their right to litigate adverse partnership decisions
caused by sex discrimination under Title VII. 331 They remain well
served by Title VII after Hopkins, where, by wrestling with this admittedly mixed motive case, the Court has served notice it will not
be deterred by the complexity of sorting out motives and assigning
burden of proof in high-level promotion decisions. 3 2 Thus, after
Hishon, women crossed the first threshold on the way through that
"glass ceiling." 333 While it might not be said that, after Hopkins,
they have crossed the second threshold and, in fact, eliminated the
ceiling, they are at least now struggling through that second threshold. 334 Indeed, women now looking up the career ladder and wondering if office politics will permit them to reach the top, after Hishon
and Hopkins, may question whether the mandate of Title VII has
been tested and appropriately stretched. aa Ultimately, the burden of
329. See id. at 1796 (discussing her agreement with the plurality regarding the shift in
the burden of persuasion but disagreeing with the substantive requirement of causation and the
broad applicability of allocation the burden of proof).

330. Id. at 1786-92.
331. Hishon v. Spalding & King, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
332.

Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1775; supra notes 179-322 and accompanying text (discuss-

ing this in detail).
333. See supra notes 16-113 and accompanying text (discussing this in detail).
334. See supra notes 114-322 and accompanying text (discussing this hurdle in detail).
335. See supra notes 16-322 and accompanying text (discussing these and other decisions).
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proof issue in discrimination cases may require clarification by legislative amendment to Title VII.338

336. As this Article goes to press, Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative Augustus Hawkins have introduced proposals to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
in the current legislative session. See Frisby, New Civil Rights ProposalMay Pose A Test For
Bush, Boston Globe, Feb. 7, 1990, at 1, 17, col. 1 (discussing, inter alia, that Title VII plaintiffs lost ground in the 1989 Supreme Court term due to stiffened burden of proof scheme in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins). "Under the proposed bill, any reliance on prejudice in making
employment decisions is made illegal. . .[and the] victims [could] recover compensatory as
well as punitive damages." Id. at 17, col. 4.
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